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ABSTRACT 
This thesis develops (a) a mission-planning tool for a Navy Mine Counter 
Measure (MCM) force to find a minimum-risk route for a surface ship through a mapped 
minefield, and (b) a heuristic to identify a sequence of mines whose clearance (removal 
and/or deactivation) leads to a rapid reduction of the risk of a minimum-risk path. All 
modeling concepts reflect the requirements of the Republic of China Navy’s MCM 
operations. 
The problem is formulated and solved as a shortest-path problem in a network. A 
grid of nodes, representing waypoints, is embedded in a representation of the operating 
area, while arcs are created to link waypoints.  The risk function is defined in terms of the 
closest point of approach distance between each mine that falls within a maximum danger 
radius along a route.  
A complete planning tool is implemented using Excel and Visual Basic for 
Applications.  A basic test scenario describes an operational area of 1,000 by 3,000 yards 
containing 30 mines; node spacing is 100 yards. The minimum-risk path is found in few 
seconds on a laptop computer, while a greedy “mine-clearance list” is found in a few 
minutes. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis develops (a) a mission-planning tool for a Navy Mine Counter 
Measure (MCM) force to find a minimum-risk route for a surface ship through a mapped 
minefield, and (b) a heuristic to identify a sequence of mines whose removal (“clearance”) 
leads to a rapid reduction of the risk of a minimum-risk path. The problem is formulated 
and solved as a shortest-path problem in a network. A grid of nodes, representing 
waypoints, is embedded in a representation of the operating area, while arcs are created to 
link waypoints.  For a specified set of mapped mine locations, the risk function for a 
candidate route is a sum of the risks for each arc along the route.  The risk to an 
individual arc is the sum of the risks generated by mines in the vicinity of that arc.  And 
the risk a specific mine generates for a specified arc increases as the minimum distance 
from the arc to the mine decreases. Additional arcs are added to the usual network 
formulation to encourage each mine to interact with at most one “long arc” in the optimal 
solution. This would allow the user to incorporate actuation-curve data, which is familiar 
to mine warfare planners and would provide a stronger probabilistic foundation for the 
optimization modeling.   We do not test a model that uses actuation-curve data, but 
describe how such a model would be constructed in a separate chapter. 
The test scenario for this thesis defines an operational area of 1000 by 3000 yards 
containing 30 mines; node spacing in the grid network is 100 yards.  Multiple runs of the 
model are made to test the effects of (a) “long arcs,” in addition to arcs that connect 
nearest-neighbor nodes, (b) the inclusion or exclusion of a “head-node penalty,” and (c) 
the effectiveness of a greedy mine-clearance heuristic compared to an optimal integer-
programming model. Using long arcs and head-node penalties encourages each mine 
along the optimal path to interact with only one arc. This allows approximate network arc 
costs (or “lengths,” to maintain the analogy with shortest paths) to be computed from 
lateral range curve data for actuation and damage probabilities of mines against ships, 
and provides a probabilistic interpretation of the optimization objective function. 
Test results show that (1) models with “long arcs” allow greater flexibility in 
routing and can provide lower-risk routing solutions, (2) removing a “head-node penalty” 
 xiv
that may double count the risk contribution of certain mines to an optimal path does not 
significantly improve routing solutions, and (3) the greedy mine-clearance heuristic can 
identify a sequence of mines whose clearance leads to a rapid reduction of the risk of a 
minimum-risk path and, furthermore, if mines are “nearly uniformly distributed” across 
the operational area, then the greedy solution will be optimal or near-optimal. 
The problem we study in this thesis assumes that a “Q-route” has been established 
in a particular area, nominally the entrance to a harbor. A Q-route is a preplanned system 
of shipping lanes in mined or potentially mined waters designed to reduce the size of the 
area in which a mine warfare commander must manage the risk from mines. Countermine 
patrols have been carried out along the Q-route (using manned and/or unmanned vessels), 
the location of each relevant mine has been mapped and its type established. Several 
assumptions are made to simplify the problem in order to develop a practical model: we 
assume each mine position is known exactly, and each has known characteristics (e.g., 
activation method, explosive force), and no own-ship navigation errors occur. We further 
assume that the enemy does not “re-seed” the minefield during the period of interest.  
A complete planning tool is implemented using Excel and Visual Basic for 
Applications. For the test scenario, the minimum-risk path is found in few seconds on a 
laptop computer, while a greedy “mine-clearance list” is found in a few minutes. This 
prototype should provide the framework for a usable mission-planning tool for the ROC 
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In the event of a conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the navy of 
the Republic of China (ROC, also known as Taiwan) must be prepared to deal with its 
ports being blockaded by naval mines: the ROC Navy must be able to maintain safe 
maritime passage into and out of designated ports at all times. To help with this effort, 
this thesis (a) describes the problem of finding a minimum-risk path for a surface ship 
through a mapped minefield, (b) implements a solution as a variant of a shortest-path 
problem in a network, and (c) develops a heuristic to identify a sequence of mines to 
remove (“clear”) that quickly reduces the risk of the minimum-risk path to zero, and 
which should yield a good solution if exigencies cut short the sequence of removals.  
The thesis also develops a prototypic decision-support tool for the ROC Navy MCM 
force. The tool will run on most personal computers and is available for immediate use. 
A. THE PROBLEMS: AVOIDING MINES AND CLEARING MINES  
This thesis studies the problem of how to reduce the effectiveness of an enemy’s 
sea mines through optimized avoidance.  In particular, we develop an automated method 
for finding a minimum-risk path for naval or commercial vessels to transit through a 
mapped minefield. (Because of possible confusion with a related term “Q-route,” we use 
“path” rather than “route” to refer to a ship’s movement through a minefield.)  “Risk” can 
have several meanings, but for our purposes the risk a specified minefield generates 
against a specified track through that minefield is the sum of the risks on the component 
arcs of the route.  And the risk to any arc is the sum of the risks generated by the mines 
near that arc.  And the risk a mine generates for an arc is a deterministic measure that 
increases as the minimum distance between the mine and arc decreases.  This is a 
deterministic approach for designing paths through a mapped minefield, which stays 
furthest away from the most dangerous mines. The formulation in this study adds 




solution each mine to engage with at most one arc. This allows the model to use 
actuation-curve data, familiar to mine warfare planners, in the cost function (see 
Washburn and Kress 2009, Chap. 8). 
For simplicity, we assume all mine positions are known exactly, and all have the 
same characteristics (e.g., activation method, explosive force).  Furthermore, all mines 
have a known damage radius and no own-ship navigation errors occur.  The model easily 
generalizes to allow mines of different types as long as the characteristics of each mine 
are known. For practicality, i.e., speed of computation, we use a shortest-path based 
methodology much like that described by Bekker and Schmid (2006) for finding mine-
avoiding paths; see also Boerman (1994).  This is essentially the same model type that 
others use for the routing of manned and unmanned aircraft (e.g., Carlyle et al. 2007; 
Reber 2007). In particular, the area of operations (AO) is discretized into a grid of nodes 
representing waypoints, and arcs connecting nodes to represent potential transitions 
between waypoints.  We will call this network the AO network. 
Because of the great uncertainty about if and when a mine will detonate and how 
much damage it might cause, identifying a true “minimum-risk path” is probably 
impossible in our context.  In this study, we will (a) compute a “risk measure” for each 
arc in the AO network as the probability of mine actuation that a ship will incur if it 
travels an infinite straight-line path containing this arc, and (b) identify a path through the 
network that minimizes the sum of arc risk-measure values along that path. (To avoid 
identifying paths that may be too long and circuitous, we may also add an arc-length 
penalty to the “risk-measure value” assigned to each arc.) 
Two different risk measures for paths in minefield have been used in the literature: 
(a) a measure based on the closest point of approach (CPA) to the closest single mine 
along a path (Boerman 1994), and (b) a measure based on the CPA to each mine that 
might conceivably endanger transit along the path (Bekker and Schmid 2006).  Case (a) 
computes risk with respect to a single mine; case (b) could involve all mines in a 
minefield, but would normally involve only a small number of mines that are within 
some “maximum danger radius” of the arc.   
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If “true risk” corresponds to the maximum explosive force that a ship can 
withstand and maintain some specified level of operational effectiveness, the “single 
closest CPA” might be the right measure to use. If “true risk” involves a set of explosions 
that a ship can experience with an acceptable level of resulting damage, then considering 
the “CPA to each mine within a maximum danger radius” is a reasonable approach. 
Because we focus on naval operations, and because warships are designed for flotation 
that is robust against damage, we will investigate arc risk measures based on case (b). In 
the simplest case, we will compute an additive risk-measure for each arc in the network, 
identify a “minimum-risk-measure path” and label that as an approximation to the true 
“minimum-risk path.”    
In this thesis, we first implement a model similar to that of Bekker and Schmid in 
Excel and VBA (Visual Basic for Applications), and then extend the model by adding 
additional arcs to encourage the optimal solution to use longer arcs. The reason for this is 
two-fold: (1) paths with fewer turns are easier to execute accurately, and navigational 
accuracy is critical when crossing a minefield; and (2) when a mine interacts with a 
single, straight-line arc, the probability of mine actuation can be approximated with 
lateral range curve data, generally understood and available to mine warfare planners 
(Washburn and Kress 2009, Chap. 8).  Our testing does not actually use the actuation-
curve model—it uses an intuitively appealing model of risk that varies inversely with the 
closest point of approach to each mine—but our procedures are ready to accept the 
former model. 
In addition, we implement a greedy heuristic for mine clearance that may have 
useful properties when trying to quickly reduce mine risk. Motivation for this result is 
that a ship may need to transit the minefield before all the mines on the list have been 
cleared and a zero-risk path established. To illustrate, suppose that a commander 
identifies the smallest set of mines whose clearance (removal) results in a zero-risk path.  
Further, suppose that the smallest set has cardinality five.  MCM forces begin removing 
these mines, but only have time to clear three before operations must halt, and a ship 
must transit the minefield.  There is no reason to believe that the three mines that were 
cleared were the best three to clear. Naturally, identifying a minimum set of mine 
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removals that gives good intermediate solutions might be impossible, but we provide a 
greedy heuristic that identifies a sequence of mines, always choosing the next best mine 
to clear.  This greedy approach might lead to a poor overall solution, but the sequence of 
removals that it generates has the chance of being a good sequence that can be interrupted 
at any point with reasonable results.  This issue is investigated computationally in 
Chapter V. 
An important aspect of our solution approach is that it can be, and has been, fully 
implemented in Excel and VBA, so that it can run on most personal computers.  
Although we can find a path that minimizes our definition of risk, we have not validated 
the model with empirical data. This must wait for further research. 
B. MOTIVATION 
According to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the Ministry of National 
Defense (MND), ROC, partial blockade of Taiwan’s important ports is one of the five 
possible military actions that the PRC might apply against Taiwan in the case of 
hostilities (ROC MND QDR 2009, pp. 41-42). Also, a US Congressional Research 
Service Report points out that a maritime quarantine or blockade by naval mines of the 
Taiwan’s ports is one of the PRC’s options in a military conflict with the ROC 
(O’Rourke 2008, pp. 47-48). 
It is critical for the ROC Navy to maintain the safe access into and out of certain 
harbors at all times. Establishing a “Q-route” system is a standard method to help with 
this access problem, if harbors or nearby waters may be mined (Vego 2008). A Q-route is 
a preplanned system of shipping lanes in mined or potentially mined waters. By making 
use of extensive route surveys conducted prior to hostilities, the MCM force can rapidly 
verify the presence (or absence) of mines in the designated routes and take appropriate 
clearance (mine-removal) actions. Q-routes are used to minimize the area that an MCM 
commander must patrol and clear and yet still be able to provide safe passage for friendly 
ship movements (Holden 1994).  
The problem we study in this thesis assumes that a Q-route has been established 
in a particular area, nominally the entrance to a harbor. Countermine patrols have been 
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carried out along the Q-route (using manned and/or unmanned vessels), the depth and 
position of each relevant mine has been mapped and its type established. We further 
assume that the enemy does not “re-seed” the minefield during the period of interest. The 
basic problems that remain are (a) to find a minimum-risk path through the Q-route, 
and/or (b) to find a prioritized list of mines whose removal will result in a rapid reduction 
in the risk of a minimum-risk path, and ultimately lead to a zero-risk path.  
The main reason we want to find a prioritized list of mines for disposal, instead of 
the best set of  n  mines to clear, is to reflect how MCM operations might actually evolve.  
For instance, suppose a Q-route has been established to enable the egress of a naval 
combat force from a harbor.  Ideally, the MCM force would clear all mines required to 
create a zero-risk path for all of the force’s ships to exit the harbor.  However, suppose 
that an attack on the harbor by aircraft-borne missiles is anticipated and the force must 
evacuate its ships from the harbor immediately.  Furthermore, suppose that only half of 
the n mines necessary to achieve a zero-risk route have been cleared.  Has risk been 
reduced to an acceptable level?  It is possible that risk has hardly been reduced at all, 
actually.  
This kind of scenario illustrates a type “optimal priority list problem” (Koc et al. 
2008). Koc et al. solve an optimal prioritized-list problem (under uncertainty) for creating 
a project portfolio, and that is the kind of model that we would like to solve, to create a 
prioritized mine-removal list.  But since that is too complicated for our computational 
platform, we are going to use a heuristic to solve this problem approximately, and hope to 
get good intermediate solutions. We note that Pfarrer (2000) uses a greedy heuristic in his 
thesis to approximately solve a acquisition-prioritization model that is much like the 
prioritized-list model that Koc et al. (2008) solve (for project prioritization). Pfarrer 
reports near-optimal results with his greedy heuristic, making it seem more likely that the 
greedy mine-removal heuristic will also work well.  Computational experiments will 
investigate this expectation.  
There are many combat-related instances of optimal prioritized-list problems, 
with one example being the Allied amphibious operations at Guadalcanal during World 
War II (Miller 1995). In the Guadalcanal Islands, the Allies wished to complete a landing 
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mission encompassing approximately 150 landing craft loaded with troops, ammunition, 
fuel, etc.  However, the Japanese began an air attack and the landing operation broke 
down completely after about 100 craft had landed. Clearly, mission planning should have 
tried to achieve a good sequence of landing-craft landings, i.e., a prioritized-list of 
landings, so that if the full operation were cut short, the successfully landed forces would 
be equipped as best possible.  There is no evidence that a good sequence of landing-craft 
landings was investigated, however. 
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis is structured as follows. This chapter has defined, in general terms, the 
problem of finding a minimum-risk route through a mapped minefield, and the problem 
of finding a good mine-clearance sequence.  It has also motivated the need for solving 
both of these problems.  Chapter II presents several models for a minimum-risk routing 
through a mapped minefield and describes solution techniques. Chapter III develops a 
greedy heuristic for mine clearance. Chapter IV describes how actuation-curve data could 
be incorporated into our basic model at a later date. Chapter V develops test scenarios 
and provides computational results for finding a minimum-risk path through the Q-route, 
also comparing the effects for mine removal using greedy heuristic and integer-
programming model. Finally, Chapter VI presents a summary and conclusion, also 
suggests areas of further research. 
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II. MODELING A MINIMUM-RISK ROUTE THROUGH A 
MAPPED MINEFIELD 
This chapter starts by defining a network model that can represent the transit of 
ship through a Q-route.  Then, we define a simple, additive risk function for each arc in 
the network that should reflect, approximately, the true risk that a ship would experience 
from mines that would be approached during a transit of that arc.  Once the risk function 
and network structure are defined, any standard shortest-path algorithm can be used to 
find an “approximate minimum-risk path.” 
The risk function we use may imply risk from a single mine across multiple arcs, 
and traversing those arcs could amount “double counting” of risk.  To reduce this effect, 
we add “long arcs” to the model, which will tend to be preferred in the optimal solution. 
This will encourage each mine to engage with at most one arc in the optimal solution.  
Furthermore, the use of long arcs should simplify the incorporation of actuation-curve 
data at a later date.    
A. NETWORK STRUCTURE AND SHORTEST-PATH MODEL  
This thesis models two types of Navy MCM operations in an established Q-route, 
(a) mine-avoidance, known as Passive Defensive MCM, and (b) mine-clearance, known 
as Active Defensive MCM (Holden 1994). We assume that all mines in the Q-route of 
interest have been mapped. For simplicity, we also assume that a rectangular area defines 
the Q-route, as might be the situation with a potentially mined harbor entrance.  As in 
Bekker and Schmid (2006), we define a two-dimensional grid of nodes i N  in that area 
to represent waypoints for a transiting ship, and connect those nodes with a set of directed 
arcs ( , )i j A , ,i j N  and i j .  The arcs represent potential transitions between 
waypoints.  Together, the nodes and arcs define a directed graph ( , )G N A .  A set of 
nodes S  at one end of the network represents potential starting points for a transit, and a 
set T  at the other end represents potential endpoints, beyond which the transiting ship is 
assumed free from the danger of mines.  See Figure 1.  
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We wish to find a route with the lowest total risk for a ship to transit through the 
area. The simplest way to solve this problem approximately is to assign an additive risk 
measure to each arc as a length, and find a shortest path from some node in S to some 
node in T, using any reasonably efficient shortest-path algorithm.  (We use a label-
correcting algorithm implemented with a deque; see Ahuja et al. 1993, pp. 136–143.)  
The risk on each arc is computed as some function of the mines that fall within a 
prescribed “maximum-danger radius” if a ship were to transit the arc.  
There is a problem with that simple approximation, however, because the 
maximum-danger radius of any single mine may cover more than one arc that might be 
traversed along a ship’s path, and risk may not truly be additive.  Suppose, for instance, 
that we define a risk measure to be 1/ CPA , and one path crosses a single arc with a CPA 
to mine m  of 50 yards, and suppose another path crosses two arcs each with a CPA of 
100 yards to mine m .  (No other mines come into play, and the maximum-danger radius 
exceeds 100 yards.)  The specified additive risk measure would evaluate the two paths 
identically with respect to risk, but a ship’s captain might find the former situation 
“riskier.” For simplicity, we will implement a simple additive risk function first, and then 
look at the alternatives that may better represent the true risk for a transiting ship. 
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Figure 1.   Network structure for the minimum-risk routing model without long arcs. A 
set of nodes 1 2 3 4{ , , , }S s s s s  represents potential starting points, and a set 
of nodes 1 2 3 4{ , , , }T t t t t  represents potential endpoints. Between S and T, 
nodes represent potential waypoints for a transit; beyond T, the transiting 
ship is assumed free from the danger of mines. For simplicity, the figure 
displays an undirected version of a portion of an AO-network, with only 
nearest-neighbor nodes connected.  In reality, the network will be directed, 
and the connectivity of the arcs will depend on modeling assumptions. 
B. RISK FUNCTION 
Two different additive risk measures for arcs have been used in the literature on 
mine-avoiding paths.  Roughly, they are (a) the CPA to the closest single mine along a 
path (Boerman 1994), and (b) CPA to each mine that might conceivably endanger transit 
along a path (Bekker and Schmid 2006).  Whatever we use to define the risk measure, it 
will relate to the CPA distance from an arc to a mine.  There will likely be some 
minimum ship-to-mine distance at which unacceptable damage must occur to the ship if 
the mine explodes.  This will be called the mine-damage radius, and any arc that passes 
within such a distance will be heavily penalized: unless there is no other way, a ship 
should never traverse such an arc.  This distance can be calculated, and depends on the 
mine’s depth, explosive charge weight, and the relevant type of vessel (TM Navord Op 
3696 1996). For computational efficiency, we also define a maximum danger radius 
beyond which a ship cannot possibly be damaged by a mine.  Thus, we need not compute  
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any contribution to risk from mine m  to arc ( , )i j  if all points on that arc fall outside the 
maximum danger radius. The following describes our basic shortest-path model with all 
risk-measure calculations. 
Indices: 
,i j N  nodes in AO network ( , )G N A  
( , )i j A  arcs in AO network ( , )G N A  
m M  mines in the AO 
s S N     start nodes in AO network 
t T N   end nodes in AO network 
pathA  arcs in a simple directed path in G  from some node s S  to some node 
t T  (all paths assumed to be simple, i.e., with no nodes repeated) 
( , )S TA  the set of all simple paths in G  from some node s S  to some node t T   
Data [units]: 
D  mine-damage radius [yards]   
D  maximum danger radius, with D D   [yards], where 1   will be set by 
the decision maker  ( 2   in this thesis) 
ijmD               CPA distance from mine m to arc ( , )i j  [yards] 
  risk-measure exponent, where 1  and can be decided by decision maker’s 
 risk preference ( 2  in this thesis) 
ijmr    risk measure for arc ( , )i j  from mine m  
maxr            ( , ) ,max ijmi j A m M r   
                  mine-damage penalty constant, where maxN r  ( 1  in this thesis) 
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Formulation of Basic Minimum-Risk Routing Model: 








         (3) 
We define the AO network only for a Q-route, since only the region in the Q-
route has been surveyed.  Thus, no ship will be allowed outside the Q-route.  Furthermore, 
for safety’s sake, we also assume that fictitious mines m  exist just a small distance 
0   beyond the borders of Q-route (only along the two side borders of the Q-route that 
do not include S and T). We apply the same risk function to those regions along the side 
borders; consequently we include a risk contribution from a fictitious mine m  for each 
arc ( , )i j  in the upper and lower row of arcs in the grid when CPA distance from the 
borders '( )ijmD  is within maximum danger radius ( ijmr   if ijmD D   ; 1/ kijm ijmr D   if 
ijmD D D  ). 
C. GRID SPACING, ARC STRUCTURE, AND LONG ARCS 
It is important to set the proper grid spacing for the AO network.  Although we 
might obtain better resolution with a finer grid spacing (and with more arcs to give a 
greater variety of angles), that finer grid comes with higher computational cost. But, if we 
set the grid spacing too large, then the approximation of risk and a ship’s ability to 
maneuver will be poor. Since this model is designed as a decision-support tool for navy 
MCM operations, and want to provide waypoint coordinates that a vessel can navigate by, 
a reasonable grid spacing is the minimum turn radius that a  vessel can achieve (known as 
the “90-degree turn radius”). Thus, this spacing will depend on the relevant vessel’s 
 12
maneuverability: small for small and more-maneuverable vessels, and large for large and 
less-maneuverable vessels.  For simplicity in this thesis, we fix the grid spacing to 100 
yards, which roughly corresponds to an 800-tons Aggressive-class ocean minesweeper 
when guiding a convoy through the Q-route for port ingress or egress (known as a “lead-
through operation,” see Holden 1994).  (Note that the 90-degree turn radius for a naval 
ship would likely constitute classified data.) 
The topological structure chosen will directly affect the quality of the path found 
through the Q-route. Bekker and Schmid (2006) use a topology that consists of a square 
grid, with each node i  connected to all its nearest neighbor nodes j , including those on 
the diagonal; see Figure 2.  Our model disallows certain turns sharper than an acceptable 
90 degrees by removing backward arcs and by adding long arcs (Figure 3).  
Unfortunately, our model does not eliminate all sharper-than-90-degree turns, and might 
disallow an optimal path that takes no sharp turns but which does move back toward S  at 
some point. Further development will require the implementation of a turn-restricted 
shortest-path model (e.g., Caldwell 1961, Carlyle et al. 2007). 
Long arcs are critical to the model because they tend to be preferred to short arcs 
in an optimal solution. This occurs because long arcs are “cheaper” in that they move 
further across the minefield with the same cost (risk) as shorter arcs. In so doing, they 
encourage optimal paths to avoid counting risk from the same mine on multiple arcs, 
which would lead to an overestimation of risk.  As discussed in Chapter 0, long arcs also 
more accurately approximate lateral range curve and actuation curve geometry, and 
would be important in a future implementation that used such constructs. 
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Figure 2.   Network topology used by Bekker and Schmid (2006). They use a regular, 
square grid of nodes and connect each node i  to each of its nearest 
neighbors j , using a directed arc ( , )i j .  Note that “nearest neighbors” 





Figure 3.   Network topology used in this thesis (we call this the “long-arc topology”). 
Nodes are laid out in a regular, square grid, with each node i  connected by 
directed arcs ( , )i j  to neighbor nodes j , as shown. For simplicity, no arcs 
are shown. 
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D. MODIFIED MINIMUM RISK PATH 
In the basic minimum-risk routing model defined in Chapter II, an approximate 
minimum-risk path is found by assigning arcs lengths ij ijc r  to each arc ( , )i j A , and 
finding a shortest path from any node s S  to any node t T .  However, we may wish 
to keep the transiting ship’s route reasonably short to reduce the effects of technical 
issues such as mine-position errors, own-ship navigation errors, etc.  (It is also possible 
that a long path would require too much time, and might subject the ship to other risks 
such as missile strikes.)  This can be accomplished effectively by adding a small distance 
penalty to any arc length and then finding a shortest path (see Bekker and Schmid 2006).  
Thus, if an arc’s physical length is denoted ijd , we find a “shortest path” using arc 
lengths 
 ij ij ijc r d   (4) 
where  0   is a user-specified value ( 710  in this thesis).  We end up with the 
following routing model:  
Formulation of Modified Minimum-Risk Routing Model: 
 




ijA S T i j A
c 
A  (5) 
E. REDUCING “DOUBLE COUNTING” 
We intend to use the minimum-risk routing model that culminates in Equation (5). 
That model is susceptible to the “double counting” of risk as described in Chapter II.B, 
but it may be possible to reduce that using the long arcs also described in that section.  
Further reductions in double counting may be possible by ignoring the risk associated 
with certain mine-arc combinations.  In particular, suppose that mine m  has a CPA to arc 
( , )i j  at the head node j  of the arc, and CPA is within the maximum danger radius; see 
Figure 4.  In this case, ijmr  will not be included in the computation of ijr  and we call this 
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modified risk penalty calculation as “without head-node penalty.” This modified 
calculation is correct because, if  ( , )i j  appears on a ship’s path, some arc ( , )j k  must 
also appear on that path, and jkr  will include a contribution from mine m .  (This 
assumes that all mines m  lie strictly within the region of the Q-route.) Both techniques, 
“long arcs” and “without head-node penalty,” may reduce double counting, and this issue 
is investigated computationally in Chapter V. 
 
Figure 4.   Modified risk penalty calculation to reduce the effect of double counting. If 
a mine m  has its CPA to arc ( , )i j  at the head node j  (within the 
maximum-danger radius so that, nominally, 0ijmr  ), the model will ignore 
the risk measure from mine m   to arc ( , )i j , i.e., it will use 0ijmr  .  This 
modification is correct because a ship transiting ( , )i j  must use some other 
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III. REMOVING MINES TO REDUCE RISK  
Depending on assumptions, different algorithms and/or models may apply to 
finding an optimal or good set of mines to clear. For example, the heuristic used by 
Bekker and Schmid (2006) tries to find a smallest set of mines whose clearance creates a 
“sufficiently safe passage.”  We will take “sufficiently safe” to mean zero-risk.  A 
solution from their heuristic will be good if we assume that all the required mines can be 
cleared before a ship must transit the minefield. But, in a naval MCM operation, the 
MCM force may need to halt the mine-clearance operation before the full “optimal” set 
of mines has been cleared. This may happen because a higher-risk situation presents itself: 
for instance, ships in port anticipate a guided-missiles attack, and they must exit the port 
before those missiles arrive.  This scenario leads us to another approach for mine 
clearance. 
As discussed in the Introduction, the naval MCM operational scenario has the 
characteristics of an “optimal priority list problem.”  In lieu of formally modeling this 
problem, we have argued that applying a sequential heuristic to identify a sequence of 
mines to clear—the heuristic will always choose the next-best mine to clear—may be a 
good way to solve this problem. Thus, our algorithm will not only provide a list of mines 
to clear, but also the sequence in which they should be cleared. This additional 
information should be useful for an MCM force. (For simplicity, this thesis must ignore 
the issue of the safety of MCM forces. That is, we assume that a minesweeper can reach 
and clear any mine in any sequence, safely.) Computational tests in Chapter 0 will verify 
whether this reasoning holds. 
Pseudo code follows for the heuristic greedy algorithm that has been implemented.  
The code is self-explanatory, and we add no discussion. 
Algorithm Greedy Mine-clearance Heuristic 
Description: A heuristic greedy algorithm to approximately solve the optimal mine-
clearance problem. 
Input: All data for the minimum risk path transit on ( , )G N A , with mine set M . 
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Output:  A prioritized list of mines whose removal will greedily reduce the risk of a 
minimum-risk path until a zero-risk path is found. 
{ 
[1] List  ; /* Create an empty prioritized list */ 
[2]  




ijA S T i j A
z c 
 A  /* Find min-risk path with original mine set M  */ 









    /* Compute “true risk” for optimal path, i.e., ignore arc lengths */ 
[5] while ( 0z  ) { 
[6]   for (each m M  ) { 
[7]    M M m  ; /* Remove m from M */ 
[8]    Recompute ijr  and ijc  with respect to M ; 
[9]    




m ijA S T i j A
z c 
 A  /* Find min-risk path with new mine set M  */ 
[10]    ;M M m   /* Put m back into  M  */  
   } /* end for */    




 ; /* best single mine to clear next */ 
[12]   *;M M m   
[13]   Add *m  to back of ;List  
 [14]    Recompute ijr  and ijc with respect to new M ; 
[15]    




ijA S T i j A
z c 
 A  /* Find min-risk path with new mine set M  */ 









    /* Compute “true risk” for *pathA , i.e., ignore arc lengths */ 
  } /* end while */  






IV. A PROBABILISTIC OBJECTIVE FUNCTION, AND 
ACTUATION CURVES 
This chapter gives a probabilistic interpretation to the additive risk function for 
mine avoidance described in Chapter II.  It also describes how standard mine-actuation 
data could be used to compute risk measures for individual arcs that would be consistent 
with that probabilistic interpretation. 
This thesis does not attempt to implement the models described in this chapter, 
but we hope that this provides useful information for future research.   
A. A PROBABILISTIC OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
We return to the basic model for minimizing risk when transiting a minefield, 
ignoring the physical lengths of arcs for simplicity: 
Basic Minimum-Risk Routing Model: 









         (6) 
Written in terms of the risk from individual mines, ijmr , and letting 
 | 0ij ijmM m M r   , Equation (6) becomes 








.  (7) 
A reasonable model for the safe transit of the ship through the minefield is one 
that maximizes the probability that the ship experiences no mine actuations that damage 
the ship during its transit. Let ijmp  denote the probability that mine m  actuates and 
damages the ship in question while it transits arc ( , )i j , and let 1ijm ijmq p  .  Assuming 
independence of actuation and damage events leads to the following model: 









  (8) 
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Independence is a strong assumption, to be discussed momentarily, but is made more 
plausible if each mine in the optimal solution endangers at most one arc.  The network 
topology and “long-arc” model used here encourage this to happen. 
Now, using a standard transformation (e.g., Ahuja et al. 1993, p. 130), if we let 
lnijm ijmr q  , it is easy to see that the models of Equations (7) and (8) are essentially 
identical.  Thus, our basic model has a straightforward probabilistic interpretation if the 
ijmq  can be computed, and if independence holds.  We discuss one standard method of 
computing the ijmq  in the following section, but take up the issue of independence here. 
If a particular mine implies risk on two separate arcs of a transit, then 
independence could be lost, depending on how risk is interpreted.  To see this, imagine 
that a mine that has a probability of .75 of being operational and .25 of being inert.  Then, 
one close pass by this mine results in a probability of actuation of .75, and ten close 
passes produce the same value. The pass-to-pass actuation events are, in this case, 
completely correlated. If, on the other hand, we assume that the mine is always 
operational, and on each pass the mine receives an independent look at the target with a 
probability of actuation of .75, then the cumulative probability of actuation accumulates 
very quickly with each pass.  
 It is reasonable to assume that actual mines have both reliability and actuation 
probabilities, which could complicate the modeling.  However, if we can allow that each 
mine interacts with only one arc in the optimal solution, we need only assume mine-to-
mine independence along the path, which is more reasonable than is pass-to-pass 
independence for a single mine.  
The restriction that paths move generally forward will encourage mines to interact 
with a single arc, as will the “long-arc topology.”  In particular, (a) the restriction of 
“generally forward” disallows a path that passes close to a mine in one direction, moves 
some distance away, and then returns to pass by the mine in a different direction; and (b) 
the long-arc topology tends to have fewer arcs and thus fewer instances where adjacent 
arcs have risk measures associated with the same mine, which would imply dependence 
along the path. Computational results in Chapter 0 will indicate whether or not we have 
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successfully dealt with this type of dependence, and will thus indicate whether or not our 
basic model is a good candidate for a probabilistic interpretation. 
Mine-to-mine dependence which could cause difficulties in the use of the basic 
model include, for instance, the minefield-wide environmental effects of temperature and 
salinity, or randomness in the blast hardening as actuation signature of the transiting ship.  
Those issues need further study, and are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
B. ESTIMATING PROBABILITIES OF DAMAGE: ACTUATION CURVES   
If a ship transits along a straight path, infinite in both directions, and with CPA 
mx  to mine m, then the probability of mine actuation during the transit has been called 
“the actuation probability” and can be denoted ( )mA x . This function is called the 
actuation curve for the mine/ship pair (Washburn and Kress 2009, p. 165). Actuation 
curves are familiar to mine warfare planners and have been measured or modeled for 
some mine types and ships; see Figure 5.   
   
Figure 5.   Actuation curves. When a ship transits along a straight path, infinite in both 
directions, and with CPA mx  (lateral range) to a mine m, then the 
probability of mine actuation during the transit is ( )mA x .  
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One conservative assumption is that a ship will be damaged by mine m if that 
mine actuates.  Thus, if arc ( , )i j  passes within the maximum danger radius of mine m 
and if that arc is sufficiently long, then it is reasonable to define 
1 ( )ijm ijmq A L  ,  (9) 
where ijmL  denotes the CPA of mine m  to the infinite extension of arc ( , )i j ; see Figure 
6.   
 
Figure 6.   Definition of ijmD  and ijmL . ijmD is the CPA distance from mine m to 
arc ( , )i j , while  ijmL is the CPA distance from mine m to arc ( , )i j extended 
in both directions to edge of Q route.  
Thus, an approximate risk-measure calculation for the basic model, when using 
actuation-curve data is: 
ln(1 ( ))   if     
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Again, the long-arc topology should help to make this risk measure more accurate, 
because a long arc more closely resembles the hypothetical, infinitely long straight path 
than a short arc does.  Typically, we also expect that ijm ijmL D  with long arcs.   
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 It should also be noted that when the actuation probabilities ( )ijmA L are 
small,  ln(1 A(Lijm ))  A(Lijm ).  Thus, minimizing the sum of small actuation 
probabilities approximately maximizes the product of the non-actuation probabilities.  
And, from the standpoint of the transiting ship, we would hope that the actuation 
probabilities in the optimal solution would, in fact, be small. 
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V. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS  
This chapter starts by introducing a standard test scenario and the three tests to be 
conducted.  We apply the minimum-risk routing model on the test scenario and compare 
results (a) with and without long arcs, and (b) with and without head-node penalties.  
Also, (c) compare the greedy mine-clearance heuristic to the solution of an optimal 
integer-programming model. All tests are carried out on a laptop computer with a 1.79 
GHz AMD Turion processor, 384MB of RAM, and the Microsoft Windows XP 
Professional operating system. Programs are written in Excel 2007 and Visual Basic for 
Applications (VBA). A minimum-risk path is found in a few seconds, and greedy “mine-
clearance list” is found in a few minutes. 
A. TEST SCENARIO 
The test scenario for this thesis models a Navy MCM force performing mine-
avoidance (for example, a lead-through operation) and mine-clearance operations in an 
established Q-route.  There are three tests to be conducted:  
(a) Evaluate the effects of using long arcs to reduce the issue of double counting, 
and to achieve lower-risk paths.  
− We claim that the long-arc structure can give our model more flexibility and 
result in a lower-risk path for the minimum-risk path problem. First, we run the 
modified minimum-risk routing model on the same test scenario with and without 
long arcs, and then compare the two solution values using the “approximate path-
risk measure” and the “true path-risk measure. The approximate path-risk 
measure is the model objective value, while the true path-risk measure is 
computed after the (approximate) minimum-risk path is found, by tracing the arcs 
in the path and the mines that interact with those arcs, and adding each mine’s risk 
contribution to the overall path-risk measure only once.  That contribution is 
computed for the CPA of the mine to the path, rather than the CPAs of the mine to 
each arc in the path. Finally, we check the result statistically to see if long arcs 
can achieve an advantage.  
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(b) Determine if the modified risk-penalty calculation that ignores head-node 
penalties can reduce the issue of double counting, and can lead to lower-risk paths.  
– Since we cannot avoid double counting when using a simple additive model, we 
try to use this modified risk-penalty calculation to reduce the issue. We also run 
the modified minimum-risk routing model on the same test scenario with and 
without head-node penalties, and then compare approximate path-risk measure 
and true path-risk measure, as described above. We check the result statistically to 
see if this adjusted risk measure can reduce the issue of double counting.  
(c) Evaluate the effect of reducing risk for a minimum-risk path by our greedy 
heuristic.  
– We hope that our greedy heuristic will find a prioritized list of mines whose 
sequential clearance will quickly reduce the risk of a minimum-risk path to zero. 
We compare our heuristic solution to an “optimal” solution computed through an 
integer-programming model (see Appendix A). We compare the greedy and 
optimal solutions in terms of (1) the total number of mines *( )m  required to be 
cleared, and (2) the amount of risk reduction when a subset of mines of size m is 
to be cleared, where *m m  . 
Specific input values for the test scenarios follow: 
 Area of AO network: 1000 yards wide (y-axis) by 3000 yards long (x-axis). 
 Grid spacing: 100 yards (11 nodes on y-axis, 31 nodes on x-axis, total nodes 341N  ). 
 Naval mines in the AO network: 30M  with uniformly distributed x-axis coordinates 
and uniformly distributed y-axis coordinates). 
 Mine-damage radius: 100D   yards. 
 Maximum danger radius: 200D  yards ( D D  , where 2  ). 
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, where 1  , 2  . 
 Arc “length”: ij ij ijc r d   , where 
710  . 
Mathematical symbols used for the tests follow: 
1z    random approximate risk measure computed without long arc 
 2z   random approximate risk measure computed with long arc 
3z    random true risk measure computed without long arc 
4z   random true risk measure computed with long arc 
5z    random approximate risk measure computed with head-node penalty 
6z   random approximate risk measure computed without head-node penalty 
7z  random true risk measure computed with head-node penalty 
8z  random true risk measure computed without head-node penalty 
1  mean approximate risk measure without long arc  1 1( )E z   
 2  mean approximate risk measure with long arc  2 2( )E z   
3  mean true risk measure without long arc  3 3( )E z   
4  mean true risk measure with long arc  4 4( )E z   
5  mean approximate risk measure with head-node penalty  5 5( )E z   
6  mean approximate risk measure without head-node penalty  6 6( )E z   
7  mean true risk measure with head-node penalty  7 7( )E z   
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8  mean true risk measure without head-node penalty  8 8( )E z   
0H  null hypothesis 
aH  alternative hypothesis 
B. RESULTS FOR TEST 1 (LONG ARCS) 
To evaluate the effects of using long arcs, we first run the modified minimum-risk 
routing model with and without long arcs for the same test scenario, and compare 
resulting approximate risk measures (objective values). Then, we calculate the true risk 
measure for each path, and see if the long-arc structure can actually reduce double 
counting and provide a lower-risk solution. Test results with and without long arcs, for 30 
trials on different minefields, are summarized in Table 1. Figure 7 shows an example test 
result of the approximate minimum-risk path with and without long arcs. Appendix B 
contains the raw solution data for Test 1.  
The test results show with long arcs, both mean approximate risk measure and 
mean true risk measure are smaller (better) than the ones without long 
arcs 2 1 4 3( , )     . To check if the mean of different with and without long arcs is 
significant, we conduct paired t hypothesis test on mean of difference for approximate 
risk measure 0 1 2 1 2( : 0; : 0)aH H        and true risk measure 
0 3 4 3 4( : 0; : 0)aH H       . The result of the hypothesis test shows that with long 
arcs, both mean of difference for approximate risk measure and true risk measure are 
greater than 0 (significant enough to reject 0H ) under a 90% confidence interval. So we 
conclude that using long arcs in the routing structure does give our model more flexibility 
and able to reduce the issue of double counting; furthermore, long arcs can result in 















Without 0.135798 ( 1 ) 
Approximate 
With 0.034454 ( 2 ) 
1 2( )z z
  =0.073459 
1 2: 0aH     
p-value=0.0891 
Without 0.100907 ( 3 ) 
True 
With 0.034008 ( 4 ) 
3 4( )z z
  =0.046311 
3 4: 0aH     
p-value=0.0796 
Table 1.   Summary for Test 1. The mean objective value is better (smaller) when routing 
structure in the network with long arcs (0.034454) than without (0.135798); and 
mean true risk measures for the found path is also better (smaller) with long arcs 
(0.034008) than without (0.100907). The Paired t hypothesis test shows that both 
data for approximate and true risk measure are significant enough to reject the 
null hypothesis (accept the alternative hypothesis aH ) under a 90% confidence 
interval.  This means that it is likely that a lower-risk solution can be achieved 























Figure 7.   Examples of the approximate minimum-risk path with and without long arcs. 
All data correspond to the basic scenario described in section V.A.   The 
approximate risk measure of the paths with and without long arcs are 
0.000974035 and 1.007169169 respectively; and true risk measure with and 
without long arcs are 0.000753084 and 1.00094265 respectively. The path 
with long arcs results in a lower-risk solution.  (The fact that the “short-arc 
risk measures” are slightly larger than 1.0, means that the lack of flexibility 
with short arcs forces the best path to pass within the mine-damage radius 
for one mine: recall that the penalty for this occurring is 1.0  .)   
C. RESULTS FOR TEST 2 (IGNORING HEAD-NODE PENALTIES) 
To further investigate the issue of double counting, we test a modified penalty 
calculation, which ignores head-node penalties. We run the modified minimum-risk 
routing model with and without head-node penalties for the same test minefield first, and 
then compare resulting approximate risk measures and true risk measures for each path to 
see if this modified penalty calculation can reduce the issue of double counting and 
provide a better solution. Table 2 summarizes test results, with and without head-node 
penalties, for 30 trials on different minefields. Figure 8 shows an example test result of 
the approximate minimum-risk path with and without head-node penalties. Appendix C 
contains the raw solution data for Test 2.  
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The test results show the mean approximate risk measure without head-node 
penalties is smaller than with head-node penalties 6 5( )  , but the mean true risk 
measure does not get better when using this modified penalty calculation 8 7( )  . We 
also conduct paired t hypothesis test on mean of difference for approximate risk measure  
0 5 6 5 6( : 0; : 0)aH H        and true risk measure 
0 7 8 7 8( : 0; : 0)aH H       . These results show that without head-node penalties, 
the mean of difference for approximate risk measure is greater than 0 (significant enough 
to reject 0H ) under a 90% confidence interval; but for true risk measure, the mean of 
difference is not greater than 0 (not enough evidence to reject 0H ). So we conclude that 
using this modified penalty calculation can not actually reduce the issue of double 










With 0.034454 ( 5 ) 
Approximate 
Without 0.034182 ( 6 ) 
5 6( )z z
  =0.000804 
5 6: 0aH     
p-value=0.0372 
With 0.034008 ( 7 ) 
True 
Without 0.034083 ( 8 ) 
7 8( )z z
  =0.000204 0 7 8
: 0H      
p-value=0.9725 
Table 2.   Summary for test 2. The mean approximate risk measure for the modified penalty 
calculation (without head-node penalty, 0.034182) is better (smaller) than with 
head node penalty (0.034454) as expected, since it ignores the head-penalties. But 
mean true risk measures for the found minimum-risk path, without head-node 
penalty (0.034083) is not better than with (0.034008). The Paired t hypothesis test 
also shows that for approximate measure is significant enough to reject null 
hypothesis (accept alternative hypothesis ( )aH ) under 90% confidence interval,  
but for true risk measure there is not enough evidence to reject null hypothesis 
(accept null hypothesis 0( )H ). That implies this modified penalty calculation 
(without head-node penalties) does not provide a lower-risk solution. 
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Figure 8.   Examples of the approximate minimum-risk path with and without head-
node penalties. All data correspond to the basic scenario described in section 
V.A.   The approximate risk measure of the paths with and without head-
node penalties are 0.000974035 and 0.000904875 respectively; and true risk 
measure with and without head-node penalties are 0.000753084 and 
0.000867963 respectively. The modified penalty calculation (without head-
node penalties) does not result in a lower-risk solution. 
D. RESULTS FOR TEST 3 (MINE REMOVAL) 
To evaluate the greedy heuristic for mine removal, we first we run both the 
greedy heuristic and an optimal integer-programming model to obtain a zero-risk path 
from each. Then, we compare the number of mines, *m , required to be cleared. Also, 
since we expect that the greedy heuristic can find a prioritized list of mines whose 
removal will result in a rapid reduction in the risk of a minimum-risk path, we will clear 
each subset of mines of size *m m  , following the prioritized list, and compare its risk-
reduction curve to the curve achieved by a sequence of optimal subsets of cleared mines. 
The latter curve provides a lower bound on the risk reduction for any prioritized list of 
mine removals. Test results from both models, for five trials on different minefields, are 
summarized in Table 3. Figure 9 shows an example test result of required mines to clear 
for both models to achieve a zero-risk path.  
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The test results show that for both models to achieve a zero risk path, not only the 
number of mines required to clear are the same, but also those solutions are the same set 
of mines. Furthermore, when we follow the prioritized list from greedy heuristic and start 
to clear one mine at a time until zero-risk path achieved, all subsets of removal mines are 
exactly the same as those from the integer-programming model which clears optimal 
subsets. From this, we conclude that when naval mines are “near uniformly distributed” 
in the area of operation, the greedy heuristic solution will be close to (or the same as) the 
optimal solution.  
To contrast an optimal solution with the greedy-heuristic solution when mines are 
not “near uniformly distributed,” we illustrate a scenario with 33 mines, with the mines 
distributed in the pattern shown in Figure 10. In that case, suppose that a commander uses 
both methods to try to find the smallest set of mines to clear, and the minimum number 
found from optimal and greedy solutions are three and five respectively.  MCM forces 
begin removing the three optimal mines, but only have time to clear two (the actual order 
of removal is immaterial) when operations must halt, and a ship must transit the 
minefield.  With the optimal solution, after two mines being cleared, the risk measure of 
the minimum-risk path will be higher than after removing two mines but following the 
prioritized list obtained from greedy heuristic (risk reduction curve as Figure 11). Since 
our heuristic identifies a sequence of mines to clear, always choosing the next best mine 
to clear, this case shows it generates a good sequence that can be interrupted at any point 













Test  Model 
Number of 
mines cleared to 
achieve a zero-
risk path *( )m  
Set of total mines 
to clear *( )M  
Subset of mines to 
clear ( ')M  




* *( )Greedy OptimalM M
Same all subsets 
' '( )Greedy OptimalM M  




* *( )Greedy OptimalM M
Same all subsets 
' '( )Greedy OptimalM M  




* *( )Greedy OptimalM M
Same all subsets 
' '( )Greedy OptimalM M  




* *( )Greedy OptimalM M
Same all subsets 
' '( )Greedy OptimalM M  




* *( )Greedy OptimalM M
Same all subsets 
' '( )Greedy OptimalM M  
Table 3.   Summary for Test 3. In all cases, both solution methods (greedy heuristic and 
integer programming) clear the same (optimal) set of mines in order to achieve a 
zero-risk path. Furthermore, in all cases, both methods result in the same subsets 
of mines to clear. This means that the greedy heuristic in this test scenario will 
















Figure 9.   Examples in which five mines, in a “nearly uniformly distributed” minefield, 
must be cleared to achieve a zero-risk path. Both optimal and greedy-
heuristic solutions clear the same set of five mines. Furthermore, both 






















Figure 10.   Examples of optimal and greedy heuristic solutions in an AO network in 
which mines are not “near uniformly distributed.” The greedy heuristic 
needs to clear five mines to achieve a zero-risk path, but optimal solution 














Figure 11.   Examples of risk-reduction curves. All data correspond to the scenario 
shown in Figure 10. The greedy heuristic needs to clear five mines to 
achieve a zero-risk path, but the optimal solution only needs to clear three. 
But, suppose that we begin clearing the three “optimal mines,” and only 
have time to clear two before operations must halt, and a ship must transit 
the minefield. (The actual order of clearance is immaterial.) The risk 
measure for the minimum risk path will be the same (0.0005) as before 
clearing any mines, since one mine with penalty   remains, and the 
minimum-risk path does not change.  (That path avoids all three “optimal 
mines” entirely.) If we clear the two mines specified by the greedy heuristic, 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis develops a mission-planning tool for a Navy Mine Counter Measure 
(MCM) force to find a minimum-risk route for a surface ship through a mapped minefield 
(“mine avoidance”).  The thesis also develops a heuristic to identify a sequence of mines 
whose clearance leads to a rapid reduction of the risk of a minimum-risk path (“mine 
clearance”). The routing problem is formulated and solved as a shortest-path problem in a 
network. A grid of nodes, representing waypoints, is embedded in a representation of the 
operating area, while arcs are created to link waypoints.  The risk assigned to a path is the 
sum of the risks assigned to the component arcs of the path. And the risk to an arc is a 
function of the distance from the arc to nearby mines. 
The model investigates computationally potential improvements to the risk-
measure approximations in a highly dense minefield scenario. Test results shows that for 
the mine-avoidance problem, “long arcs” can provide lower-risk solutions and allow the 
use of activation curve data.  (“Long arcs” mean that not only are nearest-neighbor 
waypoints connected to each other, but so are those that are several echelons away in the 
grid of nodes.)  On the other hand, removing “head-node penalties” does not produce 
lower-risk solutions. For the mine-clearance problem, if mines are “nearly uniformly 
distributed” in the minefield, the greedy heuristic solution will be close to the optimal 
solution. 
The problem we study in this thesis assumes that a Q-route has been established 
in a particular area, nominally the entrance to a harbor. Countermine patrols have been 
carried out along the Q-route (using manned and/or unmanned vessels), the location of 
each relevant mine has been mapped and its type established. Several assumptions are 
made to simplify the problem in order to develop a practical model: we assume all mine 
positions are known exactly, and all mines have known characteristics (e.g., activation 
method, explosive force). Also we assume all mines have known mine-damage radius, 
and no own-ship navigation errors occur. Furthermore, we assume that the enemy does 
not “re-seed” the minefield during the period of interest.  
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Those assumptions may not be entirely true in reality, but they are reasonable for 
a prototype. An approximate, minimum-risk path can be found in few seconds on a laptop 
computer, and a greedy “mine-clearance list” can be found in a few minutes. This 
prototype should provide the framework for a usable mission-planning tool for ROC 
Navy MCM force. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Additional work is needed to solidify and generalize the probabilistic 
underpinnings of optimization approaches to modeling mine-avoidance and min-
clearance. This thesis does describe (but does not test) a mine-avoidance model with a 
risk-function sub model that has a probabilistic interpretation.  Furthermore, we describe 
how standard lateral range curve data can be used to calculate risk-function values. But 
this modeling requires a number of assumptions and approximations that may not be 
valid in practice, or which do not fit well into the computationally attractive paradigm of 
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APPENDIX A. FORMULATION FOR INTEGER-
PROGRAMMING MODEL 
Integer-programming model that identifies the set of *m mines whose removal results in 
the least-risk route being minimized. 
Indices and index Sets: 
i N   nodes 
s S N    source nodes 
t T N    sink nodes 
( , )i j A   directed arcs with tail node i  and head node j  
m M   mines  
Data: 
ijd   physical length of arc ( , )i j  
ijmr   risk for arc ( , )i j  contributed by mine m  
   arc length penalty ( 710   in this thesis) 
*m   total number of mines to clear 
Variable: 
z   variable representing the approximate risk measure for the identified path 
ijy   1 if arc ( , )i j  is on the optimal path, 0 otherwise 
ijmv   1 if arc ( , )i j  on the optimal path and mine m is not cleared, 0 otherwise 
mx   1 if mine m  is cleared, 0 otherwise 
Formulation: 
( , ) ( , )
min ijm ijm ij ij
i j A m M i j A
z r v d y
  
     
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s.t.           
( , ) ( , )
0ij ij ji ji
i j A j i A
d y d y i N S T
 












      

























APPENDIX B. OUTPUT DATA FOR TEST 1   
 Long arcs with head node penalty Short arcs with head node penalty 
Trial # Approximate Risk True Risk Approximate Risk True Risk 
1 0.000577562 0.000546705 0.000966341 0.000603858 
2 0.001123551 0.000845455 0.004192647 0.003206728 
3 0.000672681 0.000579381 0.001173679 0.000645828 
4 0.000925368 0.000732076 0.001513938 0.000746541 
5 0.001001279 0.000766743 0.001852396 0.000903726 
6 0.000480648 0.000417294 0.000687652 0.000448816 
7 0.000807330 0.000670834 0.007279079 0.000934303 
8 0.000522961 0.000458028 0.000895349 0.000496554 
9 0.001190035 0.000890471 0.001880890 0.000901087 
10 0.000974035 0.000753084 1.007169169 1.000942650 
11 0.000476191 0.000436464 0.000814873 0.000518526 
12 0.000733513 0.000604009 0.001239326 0.000696952 
13 0.000680443 0.000571147 0.001186336 0.000671436 
14 0.001250837 0.000952037 0.002061613 0.001002332 
15 0.001410857 0.000957398 0.008017813 0.001536707 
16 0.000614547 0.000584754 0.001099147 0.000642474 
17 0.000687018 0.000586362 0.001014498 0.000607021 
18 0.000846754 0.000641033 0.001417664 0.000706301 
19 0.000962261 0.000719946 0.001481260 0.000798301 
20 0.000747701 0.000645377 0.001023361 0.000618937 
21 1.001051698 1.000768747 1.003772574 1.002920264 
22 0.001255361 0.000950139 0.002141887 0.001064435 
23 0.000530272 0.000498306 0.000737661 0.000475478 
24 0.001018953 0.000730815 0.001649367 0.000883335 
25 0.000788122 0.000649133 0.001309409 0.000685438 
26 0.000637582 0.000579532 0.001019192 0.000626495 
27 0.006617582 0.000736728 0.007093330 0.000856236 
28 0.000571352 0.000533636 0.000945936 0.000593624 
29 0.000992145 0.000772604 0.007284760 0.000938725 
30 0.003468737 0.000672653 2.001018043 1.000538656 
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APPENDIX C. OUTPUT DATA FOR TEST 2   
 Long arcs with head node penalty Long arcs without head node penalty 
Trial # Approximate Risk True Risk Approximate Risk True Risk 
1 0.000577562 0.000546705 0.000560755 0.000560749 
2 0.001123551 0.000845455 0.000747592 0.001830270 
3 0.000672681 0.000579381 0.000641069 0.000637741 
4 0.000925368 0.000732076 0.000866159 0.000783442 
5 0.001001279 0.000766743 0.000864260 0.000766743 
6 0.000480648 0.000417294 0.000438567 0.000438072 
7 0.000807330 0.000670834 0.000712321 0.000682444 
8 0.000522961 0.000458028 0.000484516 0.000484516 
9 0.001190035 0.000890471 0.000949839 0.000913389 
10 0.000974035 0.000753084 0.000904875 0.000867964 
11 0.000476191 0.000436464 0.000448316 0.000448316 
12 0.000733513 0.000604009 0.000627596 0.000599062 
13 0.000680443 0.000571147 0.000634697 0.000558852 
14 0.001250837 0.000952037 0.001071356 0.000943874 
15 0.001410857 0.000957398 0.001018941 0.001013009 
16 0.000614547 0.000584754 0.000562649 0.000561037 
17 0.000687018 0.000586362 0.000642231 0.000602060 
18 0.000846754 0.000641033 0.000697065 0.000667054 
19 0.000962261 0.000719946 0.000700646 0.001300646 
20 0.000747701 0.000645377 0.000655630 0.000618051 
21 1.001051698 1.000768747 1.000641965 1.000841965 
22 0.001255361 0.000950139 0.001017353 0.000967557 
23 0.000530272 0.000498306 0.000479842 0.000478573 
24 0.001018953 0.000730815 0.000856403 0.000758809 
25 0.000788122 0.000649133 0.000689767 0.000684106 
26 0.000637582 0.000579532 0.000565831 0.000565371 
27 0.006617582 0.000736728 0.002126748 0.000717334 
28 0.000571352 0.000533636 0.000529262 0.000528447 
29 0.000992145 0.000772604 0.000935396 0.000808023 
30 0.003468737 0.000672653 0.003388454 0.000863583 
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